Decentralized Manufacturing Supply Chains Coordination under Uncertain Competitiveness  by Hjaila, K. et al.
 Procedia Engineering  132 ( 2015 )  942 – 949 
1877-7058 © 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of MESIC 2015
doi: 10.1016/j.proeng.2015.12.581 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
The Manufacturing Engineering Society International Conference, MESIC 2015 
Decentralized Manufacturing Supply Chains Coordination under 
Uncertain Competitiveness  
K. Hjailaa, J. M. Laínez-Aguirreb, L. Puigjanera, A. Espuñaa,* 
aChemical Engineering Department, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, ETSEIB. Av. Diagonal 647, 08028 Barcelona, Spain. 
 
bDepartment of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University at Buffalo, NY, United States. 
Abstract 
The coordination of decentralized multi-product manufacturing SCs is achieved through negotiations based on expected win-win 
principles in an uncertain competitive environment. Based on non-symmetrical roles of the different actors, the client (as leader) 
is supposed to propose coordination contracts according to its best expected conditions, taking into account the uncertain reaction 
of the provider (follower). This uncertain reaction is modeled as a probability of acceptance, computed according to the overall 
scenario conditions, which include the presence of 3rd parties. Different negotiation scenarios are analyzed considering 
cooperative and non-cooperative cases. The resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated using a case study with different 
providers (follower SC) around a client (leader SC) interacting in a global decentralized scenario. The negotiations based on non-
cooperative cases proves to identify the situation with higher independent profit expectations. Moreover, the proposed approach 
shows the importance of considering the uncertainty associated with the response of the follower to the leader's decisions, 
resulting from a wider knowledge of its options. 
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1. Introduction 
The competitiveness between the manufacturing industries shifts the focusing of decision-makers towards the 
coordination of their Supply Chains (SCs), based on individual and global objectives. Many works have been carried 
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out on the internal coordination between the different echelons of a SC through the supply/demand flow coherence 
at the tactical level [1, 2]. But these works focus on the global objective of the system from a centralized 
perspective, disregarding the individual goals, which are crucial when dealing with complex superstructures of 
decentralized manufacturing SCs, especially when different stakeholders with conflicting objectives are involved; 
each stakeholder seeking to optimize its own benefits no matter how the other participating stakeholders’ uncertain 
reactions will be.  
Many works have been carried out to solve these complexities such as [3], who propose a “revenue sharing” 
negotiation approach for one manufacturer-different competing retailers SC. However, in their work, the 
manufacturer provides the initial production plan based on its own uncertain conditions, disregarding the uncertain 
behavior of the retailers SCs, which may lead to SC disruptions. Another negotiation method has been developed by 
[4] for a manufacturer-retailer SC, based on bi-directional option contracts (call option/put option); for the call 
option, the manufacturer can buy a specific amount of products at a specific price, while for the put option, the 
retailer must pay an allowance for cancelling or returning an order. Multi-agent systems also have been proposed as 
a negotiation strategy, such as the work of [5], who develop a multi-agent tactical model for the optimization of a 
Brazilian oil SC in order to identify the oil products transport plan. However, the multi-agent-based negotiations are 
built on cooperative SCs, in which all participating agents cooperate with one common objective function, 
disregarding the individual objectives and their uncertain nature, which may affect the performance of the whole 
system. Game Theory also has been used for the optimization of decentralized SCs such as [6], who propose a game 
theory strategic-tactical model; they solve the competitiveness among the suppliers/retailers based on cooperative 
games through Nash Equilibrium, while the interactions between the manufacturer and the suppliers/retailers are 
modeled as non-cooperative Stackelberg games. However, in their cooperative games, the competitive suppliers 
have to sell to the manufacturer (client), giving the client a dominant leadership, disregarding the uncertain reaction 
of the follower SCs (suppliers/retailers), which may lead to disruptions that may affect the global SC equilibrium.  
Notwithstanding, current negotiation methods for decentralized manufacturing SCs coordination allow to provide 
individual decisions based on static cases, without knowing the whole SC picture and how the other partners may 
react, leading to incomplete decision-making, particularly, when negotiation partners are subjected to risk due to the 
uncertain nature of their 3rd parties, where the novelty of this work lies. Accordingly, this work proposes a scenario-
based negotiation approach as a decision-support tool to set the best conditions for eventual coordination contract 
between manufacturing SCs stockholders with conflicting objectives within a multi-site multi-product decentralized 
SC. The proposed approach extends the limits of the SC of interest to consider both clients and providers, with their 
respective manufacturing SCs, as part of the global system, in order to improve the decentralized SCs tactical 
decision-making through cooperative and no-cooperative negotiations built on expected win-to-win principles. 
 
Nomenclature 
Indexes 
r   resource (raw material, internal/final product, energy, …)  
SC   supply chain 
Sc’  negotiation partners SCs 
t              time period 
Sets 
L             leader 
F             follower 
SC  supply chain 
S  RM supplier 
PL  production plant 
W  warehouse/distribution center 
M  external markets (final customer) 
R  resources (RM, products, man power, energy, etc.) 
r’  negotiation resource 
T  time periods 
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Parameters 
, ,r sc mrp       unit cost value of resource r to the final market m 
Variables 
, ,r sc tRS c c      negotiation resources r’ between the negotiating partners sc’ at time t 
, , ,r sc m tRS     resources r flows from sc to final markets m at time t 
, , ,r w sc tRS c c c   resources r’ flows from warehouses w to internal markets/leader sc’ at time t 
scPROF      aggregated profit of supply chain sc 
Tprofit   aggregated profit of the whole system 
scSALE   economic incomes (sales value) of supply chain sc 
scCOST  cost of supply chain sc 
scCRM   RM cost 
scCPR   production cost 
scCST   storage cost 
scCTR   transport cost 
,r scp c c   unit cost of the negotiation resource r’ for sc’ 
, ,r sc tLRS c c  Negotiation resource r’ amounts resulting from optimizing sc’ (leader) 
scExPROF c  Expected sc’ (leader) aggregated profit 
scprob c   probability of acceptance 
2. Methodology 
Within a decentralized manufacturing SC, the negotiating partners are the client and the provider, and the 
negotiation item is the internal product flows (physical/economic) between their manufacturing SCs. The reaction 
function is identified to be the quantity and the price of the item subject to negotiation at each time edge along a 
discrete planning horizon. Assuming non-symmetrical roles, and under the leading role of the client, the leader 
designs a set of coordination contracts based on its best conditions, taking into account the risk associated with the 
follower SC external conditions, represented by the probability of acceptance. To respond flexibly, the follower 
analyzes the leader contract offers based on its probability curves. The negotiation methodology is divided into two 
main parts: 1) analyzing the negotiation scenarios, and 2) preparing the final coordination agreement. As first step, 
the negotiating partners optimize their individual benefits independently (standalone case), without considering the 
negotiation item, to be used as benchmarks for all negotiation methods. 
2.1. Negotiation scenarios 
i) Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (CNS): the negotiating partners form a coalition towards maximizing the 
global SC profit.  
ii) Non-Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (nCNS): the negotiating partners, independently, optimize their SCs 
benefits, taking into consideration the negotiation item along the planning time horizon.   
2.2. Preparing the final coordination agreement  
From the leader's side: the benefits of any reduction in the uncertainty associated with the signature of the 
coordination contract are considered, which is modeled as the probability of acceptance of this agreement by the 
follower SC. To calculate the probability of acceptance, a set of uncertain scenarios (follower SC) is generated using 
Monte-Carlo method. The leader then uses these values for calculating the expected benefits. Therefore, the 
proposed contract by the leader will be the one that leads to its highest expected benefit 
From the follower's side: based on the proposed leader contract, the follower assesses the risk associated with 
accepting or rejecting this offer based on its SC expected benefits probability curves. If the expected profits resulting 
from accepting the offer have higher probabilities, then it would be preferable for the follower to accept the offer. 
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3. Mathematical model 
3.1. The tactical base model 
A tactical generic model has been developed and spread or modified according with each scenario. To represent the 
negotiation strategy, a set of supply chains (sc1, sc2…, SC) is considered with their subsets linking each SC to its 
corresponding negotiation partner (follower F or leader L). Moreover, the model includes a set of resources r, 
external suppliers s, production plants pl, warehouses w, and external markets m. The total sales (Eq. 1) include the 
sales to the leader (L) plus the sales to the external markets (M); where ', 'r scp  and , ,r m trp are the internal product 
and the final product prices, respectively. 
, , , , , , , ,sc r sc m r sc m t r sc F r sc F t
r R m M t T r R t T
SALE rp RS p RSc c c c 
c    
   ¦¦¦ ¦¦                   sc SC    (1) 
The SC Cost along the discrete planning time horizon T is the summation of the RM purchase, production, storage, 
transport, and the negotiation item total costs, respectively (Eq. 2). Here can be understood the conflictive objectives 
between the leader and the follower, as the value of the negotiation item is considered as sale when the SC belongs 
to the follower (Eq. 1) and as cost when the SC belongs to the leader (Eq. 2). 
, , ,sc sc sc sc sc r sc L r sc L t
t T r R
COST CRM CPR CST CTR p RSc c c c 
c 
     ¦¦                   sc SC    (2) 
The objective function corresponds to the maximization of the SC profit (Eq. 3). 
sc sc scPROF SALE COST                                                                                             sc SC    (3) 
3.2. Application of negotiation scenarios 
i) Cooperative negotiation scenario (CNS): the global SC profit (Tprofit) (Eq. 4). 
sc
sc SC
Tprofit PROF

 ¦                                                                                               (4) 
ii) Non-cooperative negotiation scenario (nCNS): the negotiation resource quantity ', ',r sc tRS   in the base model will 
be substituted by a constant value ', ',r sc tLRS  resulted from optimizing the leader SC benefits. 
 
Uncertainty reduction cost 
The uncertainty reduction cost can be represented within the expected leader SC profit ( 'scExPROF  ) as an 
“abridged” uncertainty risk (Eq. 5), which will be represented by the probability of acceptance. 
' sc Fsc L sc LE uncertaintyxPROF P F kO sR ric c                              c sc SC                                           (5) 
4. Case study: results and discussion 
The developed MINLP tactical models are implemented and solved for a real data case study modified from 
Hjaila et al. (2014) (Fig.1). The negotiating partners are the polystyrene manufacturing SC stakeholder (as leader) 
and the energy generation SC stakeholder (as follower). The internal energy provided/demanded will be the item to 
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be negotiated (amounts and price). The internal energy price offered by the leader varies between 0.14€/kWh to 
0.22€/kWh. 
 
Fig. 1. Decentralized SC network 
The case study is modelled using the General Algebraic Modeling System GAMS 24.2.3 on a Windows 7 
computer  with Intel® Core™ i7-2600 CPU 3.40GHz processor with 16.0 GB of RAM, and the resulting tactical 
MINLP models have been solved for 6 time periods of 1000 working hours each, using Global mixed-integer 
quadratic optimizer “GloMIQO [7]”. The tactical decisions achieved are the expected RM acquisition, internal 
product and price, production, inventory, and distribution levels. 
4.1. Results- negotiation scenarios 
Considering a nominal situation based on fixed market energy prices (0.20 €/kWh for energy selling to external 
markets, 0.19-0.21 €/kWh for energy selling to the local Grid, 0.22 €/kWh for energy buying from the local Grid to 
the external energy markets, and 0.20-0.22 €/kWh for energy buying from the local Grid to the leader SC.), the total 
and individual SCs profits resulting from the different leader contract offers are obtained (Fig. 2 and 3) and 
compared with the standalone case (SS), so the negotiation only has sense when the profits exceed the standalone 
benefit. From the leader side (Fig. 2), it seems that the nCNS leads to better solutions than the CNS at all negotiation 
prices offers, although the CNS leads to higher overall profits. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Leader SC nominal profit vs negotiation price 
From the follower side, it is noticed that for negotiation prices above 0.18 €/kWh, the CNS would lead to better 
profits, if the risks associated with its SC uncertain external conditions are not considered. 
 
947 K. Hjaila et al. /  Procedia Engineering  132 ( 2015 )  942 – 949 
 
Fig. 3. Follower SC nominal profit vs negotiation price 
Since the nCNS proves to be the most adequate negotiation approach from the leader side, it will be considered 
for preparing the coordination contract agreement.  
4.2. Results- coordination contract agreement 
So, in order to drive the negotiations towards expected win-win outcomes, the uncertain reaction of the follower 
resulted from its uncertain external conditions is represented as probability of acceptance in the objective function of 
the leader SC model. From the leader side: Fig. 4 illustrates the leader expected profits vs. the follower’s probability 
of acceptance (eqs. 5 and 6), compared with the leader nominal profits (at the fixed markets energy prices). It is 
expected that the probability of acceptance increases as the contract price increases; but at contract price 0.22 
€/kWh, the leader decides to buy higher amounts of energy from the local Grid, resulting in a sudden probability of 
acceptance reduction. It is to be noticed that the highest expected leader SC profit is at contract price 0.15 €/kWh; 12 
% less than its nominal profit at the same price. The total energy amount needed for the Polystyrene manufacturing 
during the established long term planning horizon is 24.71GWh; 36% of this amount is expected to be provided by 
the energy generation SC (8.94 GWh), while the rest is to be covered by the local Grid. It is worth mentioning that 
before considering the uncertain reaction of the follower, the contract price 0.14€/kWh was the best option for the 
leader, but after considering the uncertain reaction of the follower, the leader offers higher price (0.15€/kWh). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Leader nominal and expected Profits vs. Probability of acceptance 
From the follower side: the follower now assesses this final offer in order to respond (accept or reject), based on 
its SC expected benefits probabilities (Fig. 5), as follows: 
x To accept: expected energy SC profit (nCNS) = 2.46 M€. 
x To reject: the follower SC Profit at the nominal expected SS are obtained based on the uncertain scenarios, and 
the probability curves are obtained for both accepting and rejecting (Fig.5). However, the expected profit 
resulting from accepting the contract seems to have higher probabilities (Fig. 5), in which the follower should 
accept in order to avoid any disruptions resulting from the uncertain behavior of its 3rd party. 
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Fig. 5. Probability distribution and cumulative probability curves   
4.3. Results- tactical decisions 
Fig. 6 summarizes the contract energy demands according with the negotiation outcome. It is noticed that the 
total energy demanded for the leader manufacturing processes is the same (24.71 GWh) for the nCNS and the SS, as 
the option is to fulfill the polystyrene final markets demands. However, the energy demanded for the leader 
manufacturing processes (24.68 GWh) is 0.1% less in the case of CNS, which means quantitatively a difference of 
21.86 MWh. In fact, this means that the decision to be taken is to not fulfill the final polystyrene markets demands, 
since it only represents 0.1 % reduction in the economic sales (17.11 k€)(Fig. 7). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Leader expected energy demands 
Fig. 7 shows the expected economic decisions of the leader manufacturing SC. The nCNS results in 0.4 % and 
36.4% savings in the expected energy purchase cost from the local Grid, compared with the CNS and SS cases, 
respectively. Furthermore, the nCNS results in 2 % savings in the RM purchase cost, compared with the CNS. The 
inventory economic decisions record 40.5 % and 31.5 % savings, compared with the CNS and SS, respectively, and 
the distribution cost results in 3.3 % savings, compared with the SS.  It is worth mentioning that the total RM 
purchase cost using the CNS is 2 % higher than using the nCNS, because, unlike the nCNS, the CNS does not give 
enough freedom to the leader to choose the cheapest RM options and prices. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Leader expected economic decisions breakdown 
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5. Conclusions 
The coordination of multi-product manufacturing SCs is achieved through negotiations built on expected win-to-
win principles. Based on non-symmetrical roles, the client “as leader” designs its offers taking into account the 
uncertain reaction of the provider “follower”, which is modelled as a probability of acceptance. Different 
negotiation scenarios are analyzed, based on individual and global objectives: i) Standalone Scenario (SS), ii) 
Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (CNS), and iii) Non-Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (nCNS), resulting in 
different flexible MINLP tactical models. A comparison between the different models is illustrated through a case 
study, which coordinates different providers’ production SC around a manufacturing SC “leader”. The results show 
that the nCNS leads to higher independent expected benefits; 8 % and 1 % comparing with SS and CNS scenarios, 
respectively. Furthermore, the negotiation scenarios affect the tactical decisions the leader has to make in order to 
absorb the risks associated with the follower SC response. The proposed approach is generic enough to be 
implemented, not only on manufacturing SCs, but also on different PSE systems of different process tasks. The 
proposed approach is a practical decision-support tool allowing to anticipate the mechanisms different 
manufacturers may use to modify their relationships with their clients and providers during the optimization 
procedure, which can be used for further stochastic optimizations based on robustness in order to minimize the risk 
that each negotiation partner may face. 
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